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Reflected Spaces:                             
“Heterotopia” and the Creation of Space                                    
in William Gibson’s Neuromancer 
Wesley Dalton 
Michel Foucault’s concept of “heterotopia” is finding a welcome place among 
twenty-first century theoreticians who are concentrating increasingly on space in 
relation to social, cultural, and political arrangements.  The widespread use of 
Foucault’s “heterotopia” in literary and cultural theory stems from the popularity 
of a lecture titled “Des Espace Autres,” 1 given in 1967 but not published until 
1984, only a few months after his death and the same year, coincidentally, as the 
publication of science fiction writer William Gibson’s novel Neuromancer.  
This essay will argue for a renewed look at “heterotopia,” both in and outside of 
Foucault’s writing, as a contextually and theoretically situated concept, using 
Gibson’s Neuromancer as a literary backdrop for the theoretical mise-en-scène.2  
As a potent theoretical tool (Foucault sometimes referred to his texts as provid-
ing “toolkits”), “heterotopia” can be deployed more productively by resituating 
it into Foucault’s broader and continually evolving theories on space (especially 
in relation to social technologies/regimes of knowledge).  Such a resituation      
is important for critical discourse today—not only in literature, but also in    
conversations ranging from political philosophy to digital humanities—because 
the theoretical investigation of space has re-entered the dialogue in force.  That 
such theorization is receiving renewed importance can be seen in contemporary  
analyses of a wide array of spaces (from all eras)—for example, the city, the 
prison camp, the brothel, the sex club, the restaurant, the department store, the 
resort, etc.—as well as in concerns over the new digital or virtual “spaces”   
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constantly emerging and bringing with them political, social, and legal        
questions.  Many of these spaces (both of the past and present, real and virtual) 
may too easily be construed as special, deviant, and free, and be idealized under 
what I will argue is the ossified version of heterotopia as any “other” or hetero-
geneous “disconnected” space.  Yet the “heterotopia” designated in Foucault’s 
work is not simply an other, deviant space, but, as a real or virtual instantiation 
of a utopian ideal, heterotopic space carries the potential for abuse, for the    
violent rounding of real corners that refuse to conform to the ideal, or merely for 
ignoring the parts of the instantiation that do not fit.  More importantly, these 
spaces, and the violence that accompanies them, function to maintain the      
network of places that constitute “normal” space.  
Neuromancer is an excellent vehicle for elaborating the complexity of Foucault’s 
“heterotopology,” as well as the difficulties that can emerge from attempts to deploy 
it theoretically.  Not only was it composed and published in the same theoretical 
milieu (i.e. with similar concerns about space and life in a late capitalist world) in 
which “Different Spaces” came to prominence, but it also reflects many of the    
spatial arrangements that Foucault posits.  Both the text itself and the critical writing 
around the text can serve as examples for describing Foucault’s theories and the 
ways in which critics deploy such theories by applying them to relevant or popular 
cultural productions.  The body of literature surrounding cyberpunk and Neuro-
mancer in particular3 offers a unique example of repetition and fashion in theoretical 
terminology.  As the bulk of this criticism dates from the late eighties and early  
nineties, the conversation often comes back to the idea of networked space, global 
connectivity, and the dominance of so-called “postmodern” themes in science     
fiction.4 
Literature, in this case Neuromancer, serves as an object-anchor, something that 
can be returned to, speculated upon, something that gives shape to the theory at 
hand.  It is, strictly speaking, unnecessary in the theoretical domain to bring such an 
object to the fore.  However, for my purposes here, it is beneficial to have an       
objective counterpoint to the abstraction of theorizing spaces-in-relation.  It is not a 
matter of reading heterotopias into Gibson, but of deploying a cultural product that 
expresses the relations of space that Foucault is positing.  Neuromancer—because of 
its neurotic emphasis on space (collapsing time into nanoseconds and movement into 
the speed of light), and because of the corpus of (critical and literary-theoretical) 
writing that has followed it through the years—offers a particularly conductive wire 
with which to connect the theoretical and meta-critical analyses.  Neuromancer 
stands at a critical point in the development of theories of space:  it comes at a    
moment (in the mid-eighties) when old anxieties about spatial ordering are          
being manifested and producing a new set of anxieties (around globalization and 
capitalism, cyborg-being, etc.).  In other words, it is positioned between Foucault’s 
network of relations (“Different Spaces” 178), on the one hand, and theorization of 
the global or total network, as seen in the work of Fredric Jameson, on the other.  
Gibson presents the reader with a world in which the object of these anxieties is  
intensified, multiplied, and comes to structure the reality of his characters.  Whether              
Neuromancer is taken as a reflexive example of such relations (i.e. spatial relations 
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influence cultural production such that the novel reveals, beyond the author’s intent, 
a given spatial paradigm), or if it is merely a “good” example of these relations in a 
literary form, it offers the contemporary reader a window through which to view the 
transformation of anxieties over “real” space into those of (“hyperreal”) cyberspace.  
My interest is not in generating another critical essay on a (nearly) thirty-year-old 
novel (though I do think that reappropriating such works as retro-neo-futurisms 
would be interesting and productive), but rather in adding to the contemporary    
conversations about space and producing a critique of the current discourse around 
“heterotopia” by using, as an object of this inquiry, a work that has been submitted to 
this very discourse. 
Neuromancer also stands at the beginning of and heavily influences what will  
become a central issue for contemporary scholars:  the digital landscape.  The speed 
at which digital spaces appear and disappear makes it difficult to maintain a        
sustained analysis and offer examples of how technology can create politically and 
socially ambiguous effects.  One might think of the lionization of Twitter during the 
Arab Spring uprisings, the trumpeting by Silicon Valley of “online classrooms” as 
replacements for “unsustainable,” real classroom space, or the Western mythos of 
underground internet communities in China, based on a real-world web of internet 
cafés and secret servers, this latter being a mythos that itself comes almost directly 
out of Gibson’s imagined near-future.  Perhaps most interestingly of all, reading 
Gibson’s most recent work shows how the author himself is now coming back to and 
cannibalizing the (especially Asian-centered, internet-based) mythos that he himself 
helped to create.  Finally, on this last point, it seems we are seeing a case of science 
fiction prophecy in current scares over Chinese cyber-terrorism/war, in which a 
group of government-backed hackers has been (purportedly) traced back to     
“Housing Unit 61398 of the People’s Liberation Army” in Shanghai.  Such a news 
story seems to be pulled straight from the pages of Neuromancer, yet it also        
generates a number of questions about the digital mapping of space, of highly     
contested virtual terrain.  Like previous communication technologies, the internet is 
lauded as a means to end war, yet through its effects on space, by its compressing, 
mapping, doubling, etc., it actually “renders war far easier to wage” (Foucault,  
Power 353). 
Fredric Jameson has described Gibson’s work, specifically in Neuromancer and 
more generally in cyberpunk as a genre, as the first literary form to truly come         
to grips with the cultural ramifications of the explosion of communication          
technology (Postmodernism 38).  Gibson uncannily recognizes the cyborg nature of 
contemporary society.  There is no authorial fear of the omnipresent communication 
networks, the surveillance systems, the transgressive movements of sexuality,     
fashion, and posthumanism.  The clustered webs of fiber-optic cables, the billions of 
discrete data packages roaring through walls and bodies, surgical, chemical, and 
cybernetic modification:  these things constitute the worlds created by Gibson.    
Further, Jameson has linked this propensity for representing the contemporary world 
in terms of networks, whether social, technological, or both, with the rise of the  
conspiratorial narrative.  Such narratives, he believes, correspond to an attempt to 
“think the impossible totality of the contemporary world system” (Postmodernism 
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38).  That is, the sheer complexity of the networks and systems that surround us 
forces the author to hide them under the narrative skin, while at the same time hint-
ing occasionally at their presence.  Indeed, there are traces in Neuromancer of that 
paranoia characteristic of the broader landscape of postmodern literature, in which 
the surface of reality is permeated with the subtle ripples of something seething  
underneath.  The physical infrastructure of communication networks traces the 
streets and buildings of Gibson’s urban landscape, providing a constant reminder of 
the unseen eyes that may be following our protagonist’s every move.5  What should 
be noted here is the doubling effect that technology has on the physical environment.  
It is this effect that links the work of Foucault, Gibson, and Jameson.  The spatially 
compounding effect of technology is more important today than ever, when one is 
able to see the concrete repercussions of digital surveillance in, for instance, targeted 
drone strikes.  The daily life of an individual is reproduced in data and displayed in 
real-time on a screen thousands of miles away, giving the operator the ability to 
judge silent patterns and movements as potentially criminal, correlate various      
patterns within an intelligence “matrix,” and to summarily execute the offensive 
datum.  It is indeed difficult to come to terms with the reality of a situation that        
so closely expresses the fears of science fiction.  Attempts to narrativize these    
global-technological situations seem, necessarily, conspiratorial. 
Spatial Divides  
 
Neuromancer is at the same time an iteration of this paranoiac theme and a      
mutation of it.  The noir aesthetic of the novel immediately imbues the narrative with 
a kind of suspicion, giving the reader the impression that there is always someone or 
something to be discovered around the corner, manipulating the protagonist toward 
some yet unforeseen end.  However, Case is a hacker by trade, someone who is  
already from the beginning able to “bug the buggers” or to pull the invisible strings 
(Jameson, Geopolitical Aesthetic 15).   The networks of the controllers (in this case, 
transnational corporations) are his natural habitat.  He moves through the walls of 
cyberspace as a ghost might, haunting the data-cores and surgically extracting what 
is hidden there.  His problems, as it were, originate in his own flesh and in the     
prohibitive weaknesses of physical existence.  We learn early on that his nervous 
system has been sabotaged as part of a deal gone awry, leaving him unable to “jack 
in” to the matrix:  “For Case, who’d lived for the bodiless exultation of cyberspace, 
it was the Fall.  In the bars he’d frequented as a cowboy hotshot, the elite stance  
involved a certain relaxed contempt for the flesh.  The body was meat.  Case fell into 
the prison of his own flesh” (Gibson 6).  His initial impetus for participating in the 
book’s criminal conspiracy is a promise to reverse the damage, allowing him to 
swim free once more in the ocean of cyberspace and returning him to that “relaxed 
contempt” for flesh.  When he sees a sign for the orbital paradise called Freeside, his 
disdain for physical being becomes apparent: 
He walked through the crowd and stood beneath it, studying the 
thing.  WHY WAIT? pulsed the sign.  A blunt white spindle, 
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flanged and studded with grids and radiators, docks, domes.  He’d 
seen the ad, or others like it, thousands of times.  It had never   
appealed to him.  With his deck he could reach the Freeside banks 
as easily as he could reach Atlanta.  Travel was a meat thing.  
(Gibson 77, emphasis added) 
This stance places Case in opposition to the quasi-antagonists, the Tessier-Ashpool 
clan, the creators of Freeside, who are concerned primarily with the perpetuation of 
their flesh through physical isolation, cryogenics, and repetitive cloning.  Unlike 
Case, the Tessier-Ashpools see technology as a mere toy, while a physical          
withdrawal from humanity represents their path to liberation. 
Much of the spatial focus of Gibson’s first novel (and that of the analyses         
surrounding it) centers on “the matrix” or “cyberspace.”  After coining the term in 
1981, Gibson’s description of “cyberspace,” a virtual datascape accessible via the 
ubiquitous personal computers in his near-future world, influenced the very         
innovators of the networks that we today, without hesitation, call cyberspace, and 
thus became a lightning rod for critics reading his work.  The virtual freedom of the 
unbounded space of the networked computer, this bright movement of light, is  
counterpoised by the countless physical, social, and economic barriers that Gibson’s 
characters encounter.  Each physical space is mirrored in and by an “unreal” or   
virtual data-space, and vice-versa, allowing characters to inhabit the same concrete 
space, or even each other’s perceptions, and lending a kind of breakneck speed        
to the narrative movement as the reader is transported from city to city and,         
simultaneously, from the global “matrix” to singular “simstim.”6  The mutually   
reinforcing effects of these elements form a play of spaces, a fugue-like repetition of 
theme that slowly re-forms both real and virtual emplacements. 
The physical spaces of Neuromancer are characterized by a particularly saturated 
kind of urban space, typified by the extended cityscape called BAMA, or the      
Boston-Atlanta Metro Area, an area Gibson’s characters refer to as “the Sprawl.”  
This urban environment presents a series of juxtapositions: self-sufficient, corporate 
spires and street-level criminal speakeasies; photocopied luxury hotels and ad hoc 
slum villages.  The side-by-side positioning of disparate social entities can be seen as 
a mark of the postmodern aesthetic.  In fact, we see the same high-culture/low-
culture dynamic at work even as the narrative moves into outer space.  Gibson    
juxtaposes a hodge-podge cluster of orbital detritus housing religious refugees and   
a perfected ellipsoid space station containing a bucolic land of lakes and pleasure 
clubs.  There is a constant shifting or oscillation between spaces of luxury, security, 
and access, and spaces of deterioration, decay, and violence. 
Gibson’s protagonist, Case, is imbued with a Manichean disdain for the body as 
mere meat.  He is chained to the urban landscape while his mind is free to fly 
through the glittering, neon hallucination of cyberspace.7  This duality is again    
projected onto the urban spaces and demographies of the novel, in which the hoi 
polloi of the streets are trapped in self-destructive patterns of hedonistic excess     
and razor’s edge dealing, while the elite fly from city to city and even into orbit, 
becoming virtually immortal as they attempt to keep pace with techno-medical   
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progress.  Jameson points out that there is an obsession with this latter life-form (the 
late-capitalist elite) in cyberpunk, an obsession that is manifested in the narrative 
action of the protagonist who is extracted from his natural, street-level habitat       
and thrown into a world of jets and limousines (Postmodernism 321).  Freedom of 
physical movement is afforded by social status, which is in turn indistinguishable 
from the characters’ bank accounts.  No longer does the rebel move into and out      
of enemy territory through his own cunning; instead, he buys his way into each   
successive territory. 
Again, the novel’s physical spaces are doubled in their visual representation as  
data in the matrix.  In fact, Gibson’s first description of the Sprawl, a physical space, 
is visualized as data: 
Program a map to display frequency of data exchange, every 
thousand megabytes a single pixel on a very large screen.     
Manhattan and Atlanta burn solid white.  Then they start to pulse, 
the rate of traffic threatening to overload your simulation.  Your 
map is about to go nova.  Cool it down.  Up your scale.  Each 
pixel a million megabytes.  At a hundred million megabytes per 
second, you begin to make out certain blocks in midtown      
Manhattan, outlines of hundred-year-old industrial parks ringing 
the old core of Atlanta … (43, ellipsis in original) 
This passage reminds the reader that Gibson’s cyberspace is not only a self-enclosed 
“other” space, but also stands as a graphical representation of the “real” world (or of 
urban space).  That is, it emphasizes the fact that data travels physically between 
points on a grid, that the city itself is organized in a way as to maximize the flow of 
data (whether it be digital or corporeal), thus underscoring Foucault’s analysis of the 
current mode of conceptualizing space:  the paradigm of “emplacement,” which   
will be discussed in more detail below.  The data-scape of the matrix is shaped by,  
as well as shapes, the cityscape of the Sprawl.  The two are superimposed onto     
one another. 
Reading “Different Spaces”  
 
The infinitely networked spaces, both virtual and real, of Gibson’s near-future 
world offer a literary example of what Foucault calls the spatial paradigm of      
“emplacement.”  In many ways, emplacement is the structuring concept of “Differ-
ent Spaces,” almost a condition of possibility for the existence of heterotopia; but, in 
order to reach that concept, we must first understand Foucault’s terse narrativization 
of the paradigm shifts in (Western) spatial history.  Space in the Middle Ages, he 
says, was conceived of as a “hierarchized ensemble of places”: 
sacred places and profane places, protected places and … places 
that were open and defenseless, urban places and country       
places…  It was this whole hierarchy, this opposition, this inter-
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connection of places that constituted what might be called, very 
roughly, medieval space—a space of localization. (“Different 
Spaces” 176) 
With the Renaissance, and particularly with Galileo, there is an opening out of    
localized space.  The place of a body becomes conceptualized as a point in the arc  
of its motion—and, more importantly, a point that exists in infinite space.  With    
this unfolding, Foucault says, the spatial paradigm of extension supplants that of 
localization.  Today, however, emplacement is the dominant spatial paradigm:   
“Emplacement is defined by the relations of proximity between points or elements.  
In formal terms these can be described as series, trees, lattices” (“Different Spaces” 
176).  In other words, emplacement (as a paradigm) refers to the organization of 
networked spatial relationships in an infinitely extended space.  It relies on the set of 
relations between discreet elements in space.  It is diagrammatic in nature, mapping 
the non-spatial relationships (of power) between points in spatial terms; hence    
Foucault’s description of “series, trees, lattices.”  Further, it is driven by (both    
physical and social) technology:  it is a time in which once-disparate points are   
suddenly brought face to face (think here of the effects of the railroad, of electricity, 
telephones, and eventually of the internet); positioned in a grid (both physically, in 
terms of urban/technological ordering, and socially, in terms of various forms of 
segregation); and measured in distance, though only for the purpose of determining 
place—that is, space is measured in this way in order to ensure that discrete places 
are settled into their proper order.  As Foucault writes, 
We are in an era of the simultaneous, of juxtaposition, of the near 
and the far, of the side-by-side, of the scattered. … More         
concretely still, for people the problem of place or emplacement 
is posed in terms of demography; … the problem of knowing 
what relation of proximity, what type of storage, of circulation, of 
identification, of classification of human elements are to be    
preferentially retained in this or that situation to obtain this or that 
result.  We are in an age when space is presented to us in the form 
of relations of emplacement.  (“Different Spaces” 175-77) 
Relating this back to what was said earlier, Gibson’s physical/virtual mirrorings are 
essentially forecasted by Foucault in this theoretization of networked space.        
Foucault likens the spatial arrangements and orderings that occur in “emplacement” 
to the necessity of efficient data storage in a computer.8  Space in our era, Foucault 
contends, has become a matter of classification, order, and juxtaposition.  Spaces are 
serialized in order to ease identification, inspection, regulation, and connection.  
How are differing groups classified and how can their corollary spaces be ordered   
in such a way as to perpetuate the functioning of “normal” space (in this case,        
the global space of late-capitalism)?  In Neuromancer, the constant side-by-          
side comparisons, quick cuts from “real” to “virtual” space, offer the reader a    
structural example in narrative form of the constant lateral movement between    
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corollary spaces that Foucault is here speaking of. Within the matrix, the data      
associated with physical spaces are sequentially arranged and immediately          
accessible.  In surveying them one would see the regimented lines of rank and       
file related by Foucault to military order.  With simple gestures Case is able to   
move in and through these clusters of data, and with the flip of a switch, he moves 
instantaneously from the unencumbered space of the matrix to the claustrophobia   
of inhabiting the Molly’s subject-position; again, from Molly to the “reality” of      
his own body in a hotel room hundreds of miles away.  One could argue that       
Foucault’s analogy, that space today is arranged like data in a computer, has    
crossed a boundary—that the analogical relationship has become a real one, that 
space is data in a computer. 
Of all the emplacements that one may move through (the home, the train station, 
etc.), Foucault expresses particular interest in a peculiar kind of emplacement or 
group of emplacements which have the property of being “connected to all the other 
emplacements, but in such a way that they suspend, neutralize, or reverse the set of 
relations that are designated, reflected, or represented by them” (“Different Spaces” 
178).  Here he names two types of these spaces:  utopia and heterotopia.  The former 
are unreal spaces, through which a society may see itself, like a mirror that perfects 
the viewer’s image or one which reverses the set of real relations that constitute it.  
The latter, however, are not only real, but are culturally ubiquitous.  They are “sorts 
of actually realized utopias in which the real emplacements, all the other real       
emplacements that can be found within the culture are, at the same time, represented, 
contested, and reversed, sorts of places that are outside all places, although they are 
actually localizable” (“Different Spaces” 178). 
Foucault enigmatically describes heterotopias as kinds of actually realized utopias 
that reflect all the other “real” emplacements while standing outside of them.  How 
is something as fundamentally unreal as utopia connected to all other emplacements 
(including heterotopias)?  Foucault uses the metaphor of the mirror to explain:  the 
mirror is a site of mixed or “intermediate experience” between the utopia and the 
heterotopia.  It is a “placeless place” in which “I see myself where I am not, in an 
unreal space that opens up virtually behind the surface”; “a kind of shadow that 
gives me my own visibility, that enables me to look at myself there where I am   
absent—a mirror utopia.”  He continues: 
The mirror functions as a heterotopia in the sense that it makes 
this place I occupy at the moment I look at myself in the glass 
both utterly real, connected with the entire space surrounding it, 
and utterly unreal—since, to be perceived, it is obliged to go      
by way of that virtual point which is over there. (“Different  
Spaces” 179) 
In such a way, heterotopias function as mirrors to our emplacements, reflecting the 
set of real relations that constitute those emplacements, though first reversing the 
image and forcing us to look “beyond the glass” as it were.  We are forced to look 
beyond the actual heterotopia, to the virtual point, the utopia, in which the image 
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forms and has its being.  To look at the heterotopia is to look through it at the utopian 
image that structures it. 
This virtual/real pairing, the relation between utopia and heterotopia, is expressed 
in Gibson’s portrayal of the Tessier-Ashpool clan and their orbital dwelling:  The 
Villa Straylight.  The Villa Straylight is a sealed and distorted simulation of an old 
European mansion, without the prohibitive effects of gravity.  Doreen Hartmann, 
echoing Foucault, has called it “the heterotopia par excellence” (287).  Indeed, it 
seems to express every one of the so-called “principles” listed in “Different Spaces”:  
it is a deviant space, the Tessier-Ashpools being something other or just beyond the 
human norm; it is a timeless space, replete with curios and artifacts, existing as a 
living museum and a kind of cemetery for Western Europe.  It is a space of the    
juxtaposition of several “real” emplacements:  that is, it attempts a kind of perfection 
by representing and re-organizing emplacements that exist separately elsewhere.  It 
is a space that aspires to be outside of time, containing the means through cryogenics 
and cloning for the clan’s progenitors to extend their lives indefinitely; it is a space 
that “presuppose[s] a system of opening and closing [which] isolates [it] and makes 
[it] penetrable at the same time” (Foucault, “Different Spaces” 183). 
The final “principle” Foucault sets out for heterotopias frames them as either 
spaces of illusion or of compensation.  The Villa Straylight seems to exist at both 
poles of this axis.  It is illusory in its pretension to disconnected space, i.e. in its   
denial of the outside world; however, it is also compensatory in its aspiration to  
perfection.9  Yet, I would argue that this treatment, even while it uses the principles 
listed in the original lecture, admits to a kind of theoretical instrumentality that    
actually obscures the intricacy of Foucault’s thought. 
Reading Around “Heterotopia”  
 
The primary way “heterotopia” is used in the critical literature surrounding     
Neuromancer, as well as its general usage in spatial analysis, is to designate a space 
of deviance and sometimes liberatory, intentional and, thus, empowering difference.  
Yet, this usage seems to clash with Foucault’s broader project of analyzing spaces in 
terms of the relations of power and social technologies that constitute them.  It would 
be beneficial to revisit the lecture and Foucault’s writing around it, in order to gain a 
better understanding of how these terms (heterotopia/utopia) function within his 
broader theory. 
First, let us take an earlier example of Foucault’s use of the terms.  The Order of 
Things (originally published in 1966) was written before the famous lecture on   
heterotopia (1967) and already one may see the terms utopia and heterotopia not 
only connected, but also designating fundamentally opposing movements. 
Utopias afford consolation:  although they have no real locality 
there is nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled region in which they 
are able to unfold; they open up cities with vast avenues, superbly 
planted gardens, countries where life is easy, even though the road 
to them is chimerical.  Heterotopias are disturbing, probably    
  Dalton 45 
because they secretly undermine language, because they make it 
impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle 
common names, because they destroy “syntax” in advance, and 
not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also 
that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to 
and also opposite one another) to “hold together.”  This is why 
utopias permit fables and discourse:  they run with the very grain 
of language and are part of the fundamental dimension of the  
fabula; heterotopias (such as those to be found so often in Borges) 
desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very   
possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and 
sterilize the lyricism of our sentences.  (xviii) 
Here Foucault is deliberately intertwining space and language.  Once again, he 
speaks of utopia in terms of a fundamental undergirding:  “utopias afford consola-
tion,” they allow us to group together disparate things under untroubled words (in 
essence, languages themselves are utopian, they move and develop unrestrictedly in 
a space that is unreal).  Further, they exist as a “fundamental dimension of the    
fabula,” that is, they are imbricated in narrative formations.  Heterotopias are     
“disturbing” precisely because they display utopian formations in real space         
and, therefore, demonstrate the paucity, the incoherence, the discontinuity of       
language brought down to earth.  They “undermine language” by demonstrating 
how ineffective it is when placed up against bodies and a life, that is, when made 
immanent.  If utopia is a non-place because of its impossibility, the heterotopia   
designates the faltering of the utopian diagram when placed next to that which it 
supposedly represents. 
From here, Foucault is able to analyze certain techniques of forcing the utopian 
story onto bodies in space.  The language of the original lecture, specifically of the 
description of emplacement as a spatial paradigm, is brought back and used to help 
explain the function of spatial and temporal distributions effected by the disciplinary 
regime or technology.  In Part Three, Section One of Discipline and Punish, one can 
begin to see the ways in which “emplacement” was re-incorporated by Foucault to 
serve as scaffolding for his new understanding of modern space.  The principles of 
heterotopia set forth in “Different Spaces” become “techniques” employed to 
achieve a specific “distribution of individuals in space”: 
1. Discipline sometimes requires enclosure, the specification of   
a place heterogeneous to all others and closed in upon itself.  … 
2. But the principle of “enclosure” is neither constant, nor         
indispensable, nor sufficient in disciplinary machinery.  This   
machinery works space in a much more flexible and detailed way.  
It does this first of all on the principle of elementary location or 
partitioning.  … Its aim was to establish presences and absences, 
to know where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful 
communications, to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to 
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supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, judge it, to 
calculate its qualities or merits.  … Discipline organizes an      
analytical space.  … 4. In discipline, the elements are inter-
changeable, since each is defined by the place it occupies in a   
series, and by the gap that separates it from the others.  The unit 
is, therefore, neither the territory (unit of domination), nor the 
place (unit of residence), but the rank:  the place one occupies in 
a classification, the point at which a line and a column intersect, 
the interval in a series of intervals that one may traverse one after 
the other.  Discipline is an art of rank, a technique for the trans-
formation of arrangements.  It individualizes bodies by a location 
that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and 
circulates them in a network of relations.  (141-146, third, fourth, 
and fifth emphases added) 
From here, as if this were a detailed expansion of the original lecture, Foucault    
proceeds to describe how time is structured differently under this regime.  “Hetero-
chronia,” the concept of existing in a different time, is thus made real in the new 
structuring of movement and activity, an efficiency of gesture, and a channeling of 
communication that is effected by discipline.  The possibilities that seemed to flow 
from the original lecture are foreclosed by Foucault’s description of actual spatial 
arrangement under modern disciplinary technology.10  “Of Other Spaces,” in       
essence, is the form of this theory drained of disciplinary content or, rather, not yet 
invested with it:  a “pure” contemplation on space construction (given, as it was, to a 
group of architects). Instead of a particular regime, we are given the empty category 
of utopia.  If this lecture has been used repeatedly in theoretical discussions it is  
most definitely because of this deliberate openness, the unusual and extraordinary 
exemption by Foucault of particularity.  By abstracting the lecture, by giving it a 
theoretical force that it was never meant to possess, literary and cultural theorists 
have, in essence, created a catchall term for describing any “deviant” or “other” 
space.  But the reality of even these “free deviant” spaces, like the doubled reality of 
Gibson’s world, conceals the purpose working underneath them, which determines 
their position in the network of emplacements so as to ensure the proper functioning 
of each other emplacement. 
If, as Foucault says, the ship is the heterotopia par excellence, it is because of     
its inhabitants—the passengers, the sailors, the captain—apart from which the      
ship hardly constitutes a space at all.  In fact, the ship, standing as it does for        
lines of flight and constant movement, is a heterotopia only by virtue of                   
an unfolding.  The ship’s inhabitants are made to escape the orders of land;          
their utopia is always just past the horizon.  Such a deferred vision, then,              
creates an unstable and amorphous image:  like the messianic community, the ship-
mates are divested of particular content, rather than invested by it (as in the          
case of the prisoner, worker, etc.).  The Villa Straylight is not the heterotopia          
par excellence because its utopic vision is forcefully instantiated upon its             
inhabitants and, thus, implodes under its own weight.  Foucault’s shipmates never 
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find their harbor; the utopian narrative is never done being told, extending the     
possibility of its manifestation indefinitely. 
This leads me to the meta-theoretical push of this paper:  how and why should we 
use the concept of heterotopia to theorize space and spatial relations?  Is it sufficient 
or productive to simply deem something a heterotopia?  Why has the broader usage 
of the term (in many cases, outside of academic criticism) taken on a positive tone, 
and does that not contradict Foucault’s entire theoretical trajectory?  There are three 
commonly held characteristics of heterotopias that I would like to challenge:  1) they 
are necessarily deviant spaces; 2) they are inherently liberatory or offer a space free 
of societal norms; 3) they are disconnected from the established network of         
emplacements, i.e. they do not operate as a functional node in the network, but stand 
outside of it. 
Heterotopias are created when forces act upon bodies, distributing them           
spatially in a way that mirrors the utopian foundation, i.e. the structuring fantasy that 
precipitates such a distribution.  There can be no heterotopia as such (at least in the 
Foucauldian sense).  It can only exist as the face of a coin whose reverse is the    
content found therein, just as prisoners exist only within prisons and with all of the 
correlative networks of power and mechanisms of normalization undergirding the 
penal system (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 306).  The parochial nature of      
Foucault’s lecture on heterotopic space is an exercise in applying the art of one’s 
theory to an object, in this case spatial construction qua architecture.  That is to say, 
“Different Spaces” focuses on the creation of space as such.  Yet to understand what 
heterotopia might be in the larger context of Foucault’s thought, it must be           
recontextualized, and not simply used as a flat descriptive term.  Divorced from the 
more extensive movement of Foucault's body of work, “heterotopia” names only just 
that—“other space,” which can be claimed to describe almost any space.  However, 
viewed as a part of the broader analysis of, say, disciplinary society, the heterotopic 
construction can be seen in relation to the multiplicities it acts upon (the workshop 
with its workers; the asylum with its patients; the school with its students; etc.).  In 
this sense, a given “heterotopic” space is analyzable in terms of action and      
movement.  For example, the prison cell stands as the culmination of the process that 
creates prisoners.  Society must build prisons in order to house prisoners.  The    
simplicity of this statement is deceptive, but it should be clear that the concept of the 
prisoner (what Foucault analyzed as the criminal) as a person or body that must be 
kept separate from the rest, an imposed heterogeneity, forms the condition of       
possibility for the “heterotopic space” called a prison.  Likewise, the body of the 
psychiatric patient is placed into a definite relation with “normal” space, forming the 
conditions of possibility for the psychiatric ward.  In a different way, the student and 
the worker generate heterotopic space by enacting the bifurcation of domestic       
and “public” spaces and the relations of power that exist therein.  The liberatory 
connotations of “heterotopia” are thus meaningless without an analysis of practice, 
because certain practices may generate oppressive heterotopias. 
Heterotopia, precisely because it denotes a “place” or definite space that is heter-
ogeneous with respect to continuous, homogenous—and for this very reason—
normal space, will always connote “deviance.”  Perhaps this can be better under-
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stood by shifting the frame of inquiry slightly towards the psychological or psycho-
analytical mode.  Heterogeneous spaces, because of their discontinuity, their       
often closed or occluded dimensions, and their relation to human activity, will be 
associated immediately with deviance, especially sexual deviance.  Foucault’s own 
early examples—gardens, movie theaters, ships—all carry certain undertones, hints 
of infidelity, arousal, and homosexuality.  In essence, it is the hiddenness of these 
spaces, the very effect of their being separate, that evokes a double action of fantasy 
and transference.  First, fantasy by providing a blank screen upon which to project 
desire and, second, in transference “abnormal” or “deviant” desires are shifted into 
these hidden spaces and imputed onto those who inhabit them.  Returning to       
Foucault, it is not important that these spaces be considered “deviant,” per se, but 
that we ask why and how such spaces are constituted in the first place.  That is, why 
is force applied to bodies in order to form a new distribution of places? 
By designating a given population one may begin to see its correlative            
“heterotopia.”  For example, the Tessier-Ashpool clan, Gibson’s apotheosis of trans-
national corporate elite, forms a couplet with the space created by and for them:  the 
Villa Straylight.  The Villa Straylight is heterotopic in the sense that it forms the  
visible sign of the clan’s “articulable” utopic vision: 
“The Villa Straylight,” said a jeweled thing on the pedestal, in      
a voice like music, “is a body grown in upon itself, a Gothic     
folly.  Each space in Straylight is in some way secret, this endless 
series of chambers linked by passages, by stairwells vaulted like 
intestines, where the eye is trapped in narrow curves, carried   
past ornate screens, empty alcoves.  … By the standards of the  
archipelago,” the head continued, “ours is an old family, the con-
volutions of our home reflecting that age.  But reflecting some-
thing else as well.  The semiotics of the Villa bespeak a turning in, 
a denial of the bright void beyond the hull.  Tessier and Ashpool 
climbed the well of gravity to discover that they loathed space.  
… We have sealed ourselves away behind our money, growing 
inward, generating a seamless universe of self.”  (Gibson 172-73, 
emphases added) 
Lady 3Jane is here expressing the logic of human overcoming (a fairly common SF 
trope), touted in the real world by “transhumanists,” that characterizes the becoming-
nature of humanity’s next evolutionary stage.11  The particularly cyberpunk iteration 
of this trope sees the potential for such an overcoming in the power afforded to the 
wealthy.  The obsession with the over-class of corporate elites comes into focus with 
the image of the inseparable combination Villa Straylight/Tessier-Ashpool:  by   
forcing a virtual discontinuity with normal space (building an orbital mansion) and 
by binding themselves to their architectural creation, human evolution becomes a 
spatial-economic operation.  By denying the real space of the outside, the space that 
slowly deteriorates our bodies, and by fusing with the inward-facing construction of 
the dwelling, the clan attempts to create a utopia of extended self.  Yet, it is precisely 
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the semiotics of the dwelling that “bespeak a turning in … generating a seamless 
universe of the self”; in other words, it is the language of the Villa Straylight that 
would make of it a utopia, echoing Foucault’s description of the “fabular” nature of 
utopia, the consolatory nature of utopian language.  It is the narrative behind such a 
structure as the Villa Straylight that points towards its utopian foundation.  However, 
the actually existing arrangement (which proves to be far from seamless) is intensely 
unsettling because it demonstrates the corruption of bodies that occurs when a utopic 
image is forcibly laid down in space. 
The heterotopia exists at/as this intersection of forces, bodies, and spatial            
arrangements.  Spaces (or emplacements) exist as a network of relations, which  
precludes any one space from being an island of liberation in a sea of control.   
Simply designating a site as “heterotopic” is meaningless without the corresponding 
analyses that make the term possible in the first place.  David Harvey demonstrates 
the failings of such a generalized theory of heterotopia by taking Foucault’s        
characterization of the ship (as “heterotopia par excellence”) and applying it to the 
cruise ship: 
Ultimately, the whole essay on heterotopia reduces itself to the 
theme of escape.  “The ship is the heterotopia par excellence,” 
wrote Foucault.  “In civilizations without boats, dreams dry up, 
espionage takes the place of adventure and police take the place 
of pirates.”  I keep expecting these words to appear on commer-
cials for a Caribbean cruise.  But here the banality of the idea of 
heterotopia becomes all too plain because the commercialised 
cruise ship is indeed a heterotopic site if ever there was one;     
and what is the critical, liberatory and emancipatory point of  
that? (538) 
This passage points to the theoretical deficiency of the original lecture, both for later 
thinkers and even for Foucault himself. Relating this point back to Gibson, it would 
be easy, given the frame of the lecture, to designate “the spindle,” Freeside, the   
orbital gaming/sex resort to which the clan’s Villa is attached, as a “heterotopia.”  
Yet, just as Harvey points out, if it is sheer escape that characterizes the heterotopic 
space, what is the liberatory point?  Foucault gestures to this problem in an interview 
with Paul Rabinow for the architectural magazine Skyline:  “I do not think that it is 
possible to say that one thing is of the order of ‘liberation’ and another is of the order 
or ‘oppression.’  … I do not think that there is anything that is functionally—by its 
very nature—absolutely liberating.  Liberty is a practice” (Power 354).12  If Freeside 
is to be designated as a heterotopia, then one must attempt to describe its utopic  
aspiration, the composition of its population, the shape it presses upon them, and the 
“diagram,” in Foucauldian/Deleuzian terms (Deleuze, Foucault 34-35), that lays 
down the conditions of possibility to create such a space.  Heterotopia, as a concept, 
is innately tied to objects, things, bodies—in short, populations—and the actions 
upon them that attempt to bring them into the utopian arrangements designated by 
language and mapped in the diagram. 
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By terming certain spaces “heterotopias” (full stop), literary critics, along with 
many others, miss the larger point:  heterotopias exist only as a function of the larger 
network of emplacements.  “Heterotopia” as a concept has much more analytical 
depth and rhetorical force when understood with reference to Foucault’s broader 
methodology.  It functions in naming a space only when that space is implicated in 
the wider theoretical context (including, for instance, a historiographical account     
of formation, a sociopolitical account of power relations, a cultural account of     
production, etc.), which in Foucault’s short excursus takes the form of an analysis of 
utopian space.  There is no heterotopic space that does not have a corresponding 
utopic vision and, far from being merely “imaginary,” utopias give form to the    
content of heterotopias.  They are the effective “shape” of a given space.  This mis-
use is significant because it overlooks a fundamental characteristic of heterotopias:  
they are always incomplete; narratively incoherent; sites of linguistic, classificatory, 
and even physical violence.  The real question of heterotopia is how to conceive of 
the bodies contained within it, the utopic narrative or vision that marks them, and the 
network of emplacements of which they are a function. 
Total Space  
 
Jameson’s concept of “total space” is theoretically parallel to that of heterotopia 
and could possibly help in rectifying some of the misuses of Foucault’s term.  It  
describes spaces that attempt to escape the imposed order of society and close   
themselves off from the decomposition inherent to life in real (heterogeneous) space.  
Like Foucault and Gibson, Jameson grounds his theory of disconnected space     
(particularly in architecture) in the desire for escape and, ultimately, in utopia.  The 
above pairing of Freeside/Villa Straylight works well to describe Jameson’s “total 
space,” as the pairing is an attempt to possess within it and to reform all of the     
relations of space and bodies necessary for a new (utopian) society.  Unlike previous 
forms, the total space’s utopian project is completely singular, stemming from its 
self-imposed discontinuity with connected or networked space.  The ultimate goal of 
the Tessier-Ashpool clan is to break away from humanity, to shape themselves in 
isolation into a posthuman organism that can function indefinitely, siphoning off the 
material wealth (the life-blood of Gibson’s ultra-neoliberal world) of vacationers, 
gamblers, and investors. 
Lady 3Jane’s essay on the Villa Straylight describes the orbital resort “town” of 
Freeside as having to “conceal the fact that the interior of the spindle is arranged 
with the banal precision of furniture in a hotel room” (Gibson 172).  Gibson again 
produces a spatially binary relationship, this time between the inward-spiraling,  
“intestinal” catacombs of Straylight and the meticulously arranged and shiny-new 
hotel-space of Freeside.  An organism attached to a mechanism.  No longer required 
to be connected to the network of emplacements that once sustained them, they are 
able to live parasitically on the energy created by the global movements below.  By 
burrowing deeper and deeper into their self-imposed exile, they hope once and for all 
to break ties with the imperfection of the real world.  In doing so, they manage to 
create their own unsettling, flawed, and disastrous heterotopia.13 
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In sketching “an analysis of a full-blown postmodern building,” Jameson        
consciously passes over the works of self-proclaimed proponents of “post-         
modern architecture” such as Michael Graves or Robert Venturi, self-identified   
semioticians14 of the dwelling (Postmodernism 38).  Instead, he turns his critical 
gaze toward the hotels of John Portman, and specifically the Westin Bonaventure in 
Los Angeles.  The Bonaventure hotel “aspires to being a total space, a complete 
world, a kind of miniature city” (Jameson, Postmodernism 40).  Like Freeside, 
which contains its own world of hotels, brothels, casinos, restaurants, recreational 
zones, and even a false ecosystem, the Bonaventure juxtaposes a virtual world of 
emplacements:  shops, restaurants, gyms and recreational facilities.  The Bonaven-
ture could easily fit into the sequence of nearly indistinguishable hotels that the pro-
tagonists of Neuromancer, as well as of Gibson’s other novels, inhabit as they soar 
around the world. Freeside only seems to extend this sequence, which itself admits 
to Jameson’s analysis of cyberpunk as a genre that possesses a perverse affinity     
for expressing the postmodern fascination with the limitless lives of the corporate 
elite.  Freeside’s existence in the vacuum of space, as well as Straylight’s lack of 
discernible entranceway, resonates with Jameson's description of the late-capitalist 
hotel, as he argues that “ideally the minicity of Portman’s Bonaventure ought not to 
have entrances at all, since the entryway is always the seam that links the building to 
the rest of the city that surrounds it:  for it does not wish to be a part of the city but 
rather its equivalent and replacement or substitute” (Postmodernism 40).  Unlike   
the great modern projects of Corbusier and the International Style’s universal      
pretensions, the Bonaventure has no aspiration to transform the city around it; rather, 
it is “content to ‘let the fallen city fabric continue to be in its being’ (to parody 
Heidegger)” (Jameson, Postmodernism 41).  Jameson continues, “This diagnosis is 
confirmed by the great reflective glass skin of the Bonaventure … [T]he glass skin 
achieves a peculiar and placeless dissociation of the Bonaventure from its neighbor-
hood:  it is not even an exterior, inasmuch as when you seek to look at the hotel’s 
outer walls you cannot see the hotel itself but only the distorted images of everything 
that surrounds it” (42).  Given this conceit, we may add that the hotel, insofar as it 
embodies aspirations of total space, attempts to reject the diagram of forces that 
would shape its population by creating a “disconnected network” of its own.  It   
attempts, in other words, to cut all connections with the city fabric while establishing 
within itself a new and better form of all of these same connections.  Those inside the 
entryless structure are able to look out, while those attempting to look in would only 
see the vague and deformed reflections of their own existences. 
This image of the spatial mirror draws our attention back to Foucault’s account of 
the mirror as metaphor for the relationship between utopia and heterotopia, and   
finally his rejection of the possibility of any such disconnected or “total” spaces: 
The space in which we are living, by which we are drawn outside 
ourselves, in which, as a matter of fact, the erosion of our life, our 
time, and our history takes place, this space that eats and scrapes 
away at us, is also heterogeneous space in itself.  In other words, 
we do not live in a kind of void, within which individuals and 
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things might be located.  We do not live in a void that would be 
tinged with shimmering colors, we live inside an ensemble of    
relations that define emplacements that are irreducible to each 
other and absolutely nonsuperposable.  (“Different Spaces” 177-
78, emphasis added) 
Aspirations to total or disconnected utopic space are ultimately attempts to escape 
the inescapable.  Portman’s Bonaventure succeeds only in reproducing, in a spatially 
intensive way, the diagram of the culture that produces it and thus fails to achieve 
anything like utopia, forming instead a heterotopia.  Similarly, Case and his reverse 
image, the Tessier-Ashpools, both have utopian agendas that are destined to falter 
and can only be reflected in heterotopic space.  For Case, his desire to escape flesh is 
manifest in his retreat to cyberspace, which is an image of the void “tinged with 
shimmering colors,” an essentially unreal image of homogeneous space, through 
which one moves unabated and without obstacle.  For the Tessier-Ashpools,          
the creation of the Villa Straylight, with its cryogenic sleep chambers, its cloning 
facilities, its complete break from the order of emplacement that is defined by this 
ensemble of relations through its existence in a real void (outer space)—this is all an 
attempt to escape the “erosion of life” and history.  However, Case’s desire to “fix” 
his body so that he might float freely once more in cyberspace, coupled with the T-A 
clan’s desire to become immortal through repetitive cloning, belies a desire to escape 
heterogeneous space altogether (the “space that eats and scrapes away at us”) and 
create a space that is free of this degeneration and limitation.  The utopian vision (of 
just such a space) can only serve to reflect the flawed and decomposing fabric of  
real space. 
The creation of new heterotopic spaces is happening all the time:  from online 
universities to rehabilitation centers, ever increasing prison populations to mega-
churches, massively multiplayer video games to video game work-camps.  To     
theorize these arrangements in purely spatial terms is to reduce the subjectivizing 
narratives imposed on bodies to a function of their environs, instead of a function of 
power relations.  The interesting thing about heterotopias is not their “freedoms,” 
some idealized form of deviance, but the way in which they actually perpetuate 
“normal” space by distracting us from its constant deterioration.  Literature like  
Neuromancer is important in our theorizing because it reminds us that new spaces, 
both real and virtual, are created through narrative, and that such narration is a   
practice.  How can we avoid reductive analyses of space as subjective experience 
(the types of analyses that Foucault avoided under the heading “phenomenology”) 
and, instead, emphasize the subject-forming function of spaces?  Finally, how can 
we begin to theorize liberatory practices in a productive way even as critical       
discourse turns more and more toward space as its theoretical polestar? 
Wesley Dalton 
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Marxist and post-structuralist thought, as well as emerging para-academic          
spaces. 
Notes 
 
1 This lecture has been given various titles:  “Of Other Spaces,” “Heterotopias,” 
“Different Spaces,” etc.  I am here working with the Robert Hurley translation, 
which uses the latter of these titles:  “Different Spaces.”  
2 For an excellent (and more recent) bibliography regarding previous debates 
among critics of Neuromancer, see Benjamin Fair. 
3 This short-lived, yet explosive subgenre lasted less than a decade.  Some critics 
even place its relevant lifespan at as short as four years (from the publication of  
Neuromancer in 1984 to the publication of Mona Lisa Overdrive in 1988).  See, for 
example Neil Easterbrook, 378, and for a later assessment of cyberpunk’s decline, 
Ross Farnell, 459-60. 
4 For an interesting introduction to the conversation surrounding “postmodern 
science fiction,” see John R. R. Christie.  
5 Jameson has pointed to such a trend in works such as Three Days of the Condor 
(Geopolitical Aesthetic 9-15) or, more recently, in The Matrix, in which the real 
world of the protagonist is doubled in the networks of communication that         
physically trace the environments through which he moves.  The conspiracy thriller 
is an invitation to peek under the noisy surface of the world at the serene sanctum of 
the real controllers of society (Signatures 300-303). 
6 Simstim, short for “simulated stimulation,” is a fictional technology that serves 
as a dominant medium in Gibson’s future world.  It allows the wearer to enter the 
sensorium of whoever has or is presently recording, thus virtually inhabiting that 
person’s body. 
7 Istvan Csicsery-Ronay relates this position to a kind of romanticism inherent in 
Gibson’s work. 
8 Foucault’s prescience is here demonstrated in linking the data traveling through  
a computer to “discrete elements” (in this case cars) traveling through physical 
channels:  “Further, we are aware of the importance of problems of emplacement in 
contemporary engineering:  the storage of information or of the partial results of a 
calculation in the memory of a machine, the circulation of discrete elements, with a 
random output (such as, quite simply, automobiles or in fact the tones on a telephone 
line), the identification of tagged or coded elements in an ensemble that is either 
distributed haphazardly or sorted in a univocal classification, or sorted according to  
a plurivocal classification, and so on” (“Different Spaces” 176).  This was an      
especially important issue in 1967; when data was stored on magnetic reels it was   
of the utmost importance to store it in a way that best lent itself to efficient           
retrieval. 
9 Along with Hartmann, Ross Farnell and Christopher Palmer also pick up on this 
thread.  For a similar use in legal studies, see Julie E. Cohen.  
10 David Harvey also notes this shift in passing:  “The presumption is that         
power/knowledge is or can be dispersed into spaces of difference.  This idea is    
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tacitly reneged upon in Discipline and Punish and given an entirely different reading 
in his 1978 interview on ‘Space, Knowledge, and Power’” (538). 
11 This connection is brought into especially sharp contrast when read through 
Case’s foreshadowing memory of the wasps’ nest and its destruction (Gibson 126-
27).  The Villa Straylight is this wasps’ nest:  an organic unity of will, flesh, and  
concrete.  It is beyond human. 
12 The extension of this quotation is significant to the conversation:  “So there may, 
in fact, always be a certain number of projects whose aim is to modify some        
constraints, to loosen, or even break them, but none of these projects can, simply    
by its nature, assure that people will have liberty automatically, that it will be       
established by the project itself” (Foucault, Power 354).  This short interview also 
has a revealing aside by Foucault that points to the theoretical insignificance of the 
lecture in question:  “Yes.  Space is fundamental in any form of communal life; 
space is fundamental in any exercise of power.  To make a parenthetical remark, I 
recall having been invited, in 1966, by a group of architects to do a study of space, of 
something that I called at that time ‘heterotopias,’ those singular spaces whose   
functions are different or even the opposite of others.  The architects worked on this, 
and at the end of the study someone spoke up—a Sartrean psychologist—who fire-
bombed me, saying that space is reactionary and capitalist, but history and becoming 
are revolutionary.  This absurd discourse was not at all unusual at the time.  Today, 
everyone would be convulsed with laughter at such a pronouncement, but not    
then” (361). 
13 The Tessier-Ashpools’ movement inward is contrasted by Case’s gradual       
expansion outward into cyberspace and in his hallucinatory “run” (his final move to 
hack the T-A data cores), in which he sees himself finally dissolved, if only for an 
instant, in the infinite digital space of the matrix.  Yet, his utopian escape (the free-
dom of the matrix) is constantly withheld in a much more banal way:  the physical 
needs of his body remind him of the “virtuality” of his life in cyberspace. 
14 It is worth noting here that Lady 3Jane’s essay describing the architecture of 
Straylight is written for a “semiotics course,” instantly bringing to mind the blunt 
application of theoretical high-fashion to architecture that has been pointed to, for 
instance, in the writing of Robert Venturi (see, for instance, Venturi’s seminal work 
in Learning from Las Vegas).  
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